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This review examines how legislators' race and ethnicity affect the representation of racial and ethnic minorities' interests and priorities in the mass public, how these legislators affect the political participation of these groups, how the presence of these candidates affects voter decision making, and how their prevalence impacts the composition of the parties and the nature of public policy. It also points to new directions and opportunities for scholarship on why minority legislators matter for American politics. Adapted from the source document.

This review examines how legislators' race and ethnicity affect the representation of racial and ethnic minorities' interests and priorities in the mass public, how these legislators affect the political participation of these groups, how the presence of these candidates affects voter decision making, and how their prevalence impacts the composition of the parties and the nature of public policy. It also points to new directions and opportunities for scholarship on why minority legislators matter for American politics.

Abstract We use state legislator ideology estimates (standardized W‐nominate values) to examine whether Latino and African American legislator ideological differences can be explained away by traditional constituency characteristics like partisanship and demographics. We find instead that both Black and Latino legislators are unique "types." Our evidence supports the theoretical presumption that there is a minority dimension to legislative voting and that it is uniquely personified by minority officeholders. White, Black, Latino, Democrat, and Republican representatives are all examined for responsiveness to different partisan and racial/ethnic populations. The dataset includes all 50 state legislatures from the 1999–2000 legislative sessions, including information from the U.S. Census, NALEO, the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, Gerald Wright's Representation in the American Legislature Project, and CQ Press's Almanac of State Legislative Elections.

Members of Congress from racial minority groups often find themselves in a unique predicament: they represent constituencies that are more economically disadvantaged than those of their white colleagues and they themselves experience marginalization during the process of policy formulation on Capitol Hill. In Twists of Fate, Vanessa C. Tyson illuminates the ways in which House representatives from racial minority groups have worked together, through an understanding of their linked political fates, to advocate successfully for equality and social justice.

AbstractThe creation of racial/ethnic majority-minority districts lies at the heart of debates regarding the utility of descriptive representation for minority policy advocacy. The general puzzle that emerges from these debates, however, rests on the possibility that by electing representatives who are policy outsiders, minority interests would exert little influence in the policy decisions of median-dominated institutions. The authors present a model that shows how majority-minority districts can act to (1) increase the likelihood of electing minority representatives who are unique policy advocates and (2) concurrently increase the level of institutional status of descriptive representatives. The empirical analysis employs a novel data set of observations on political, sociodemographic, roll-call and institutional position, covering twenty U.S. states in the late 1990s and over 2,600 state legislative seats to show how majority-minority districts produce policy outsiders as well as institutional insiders.

Analyzes California and Michigan state legislature restrictions on legislators' tenure in office and impact on electoral prospects of minority candidates; comparison to Georgia and Pennsylvania.

What explains the behavior of legislators on bills that restrict the rights of marginalized minorities? Studies of representation typically focus on factors like party or public opinion but seldom account for theories of minority representation like electoral capture or subconstituency politics. One reason for this is that data allowing for the comparison of these theories are seldom available for U.S. House districts. We overcome this hurdle by implementing multilevel regression with post-stratification to estimate opinion on gay marriage during the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act vote. We show that subconstituency politics explains legislators' behavior better than electoral capture, party, or public opinion.

Despite claims that diversity benefits the democratic process, critics question whether increased diversity significantly improves government responsiveness and accountability beyond electoral competition and constituency influence. The authors advance a diversity infrastructure theory to explain why and how minority legislators have kept minority interests on the congressional agenda. Using data on congressional hearings held on civil rights and social welfare from 1951 to 2004, the authors find that despite the decline of national attention to civil rights and social welfare issues in general, increased diversity in the House and to a lesser extent in the Senate is responsible for keeping minority interests on the congressional agenda. Adapted from the source document.